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Digest:  Musaelian v. Adams 
Julie Sarto 
Opinion by Werdegar, J., expressing the unanimous view of 
the court. 
Issue 
Under California Code of Civil Procedure section 128.71 can 
attorney’s fees be awarded to a party who represented him or 
herself in responding to a filing abuse? 
Facts 
Joseph Reiter, represented by Attorney William L. Adams, 
obtained a default judgment against Andrew Musaelian and 
Andrew Musaelian’s business, Attorney Legal Research (ALR).2  
Reiter sought partial satisfaction of this judgment through a 
forced sale of a residence owned jointly by Andrew Musaelian 
and his wife, Mary Musaelian.3  Seeking to avoid the sale, Mary 
Musaelian filed a third party claim of ownership.4  When the 
Superior Court denied this claim, the Musaelians sought to 
protect their home by filing for chapter 13 relief in the United 
States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of California.5  
Still seeking to satisfy the judgment against Andrew Musaelian 
and ALR, Reiter filed claims against the bankruptcy estate.6  
However, the bankruptcy court dismissed the claim against ALR, 
reasoning that it could be satisfied only from ALR’s assets, which 
did not include the Musaelian’s home.7 
Based on Reiter’s attempts to force the sale of the 
Musaelian’s residence to satisfy the default judgment entered 
against ALR, Mary Musaelian then filed this suit against Reiter 
and Adams, seeking damages on theories of negligence, 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, abuse of process, 
 1 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 128.7 (West 2006). 
 2 Musaelian v. Adams, 198 P.3d 560, 561 (Cal. 2009).  Reiter brought suit seeking 
damages for conduct relating to litigation between him and one of ALR’s clients. Id. 
 3 Id. 
 4 Id. 
 5 Id. 
 6 Id. 
 7 Id. 
Do Not Delete 4/19/2010 11:10 AM 
446 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 13:445
slander of title, invasion of privacy, and malicious prosecution.8  
Adams, representing himself and, joined by Reiter, demurred on 
the grounds that the first five causes of action were subject to the 
litigation privilege of Civil Code section 47, and that the sixth 
cause of action for malicious prosecution lacked merit because 
the state court action had terminated in Reiter’s favor.9  They 
additionally moved under section 128.7 for sanctions, including 
attorney fees against Mary Musaelian and her attorney.10 
In sustaining Adams’ and Reiter’s demurrers without leave 
to amend, the trial court also granted the motions for sanctions, 
ordering Mary Musaelian and her attorney to pay $25,050 to 
Adams as “reasonable sanctions including attorney fees.”11  
Reversing the award of attorney fees to Adams, the court of 
appeal concluded that because Adams had represented himself, 
he had not “incurred” attorney fees for purposes of sanctions 
under section 128.7.12 
Analysis 
The court first noted that, in California, following the 
“American Rule” and codified in Code of Civil Procedure section 
1021, each party to a lawsuit ordinarily must pay its own 
attorney fees.13  The measures and modes of attorney 
compensation are left to the agreement of the parties “[e]xcept as 
attorney’s fees are specifically provided for by statute.”14  The 
court then acknowledged that California Code of Civil Procedure 
section 128.7 was such a statute.15  Section 128.7 requires that 
parties and their attorneys certify that pleadings or other written 
materials presented to the courts have merit “to the best of the 
person’s knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an 
inquiry reasonable under the circumstances.”16  Sanctions are 
authorized for violations of the section: 
A sanction imposed for violation of subdivision (b) shall be limited to 
what is sufficient to deter repetition of this conduct or comparable 
conduct by others similarly situated. . . . [T]he sanction may consist of, 
or include, directives of a nonmonetary nature, an order to pay a 
penalty into court, or, if imposed on motion and warranted for 
effective deterrence, an order directing payment to the movant of 
 8 Id. 
 9 Id. 
 10 Id. 
 11 Id. 
 12 Id. 
 13 Id. at 562; CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1021 (West 2006). 
 14 Musaelian, 198 P.3d at 562 (citing § 1021). 
 15 Id. 
 16 Id. (citing § 1021(b)). 
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some or all of the reasonable attorney’s fees and other expenses 
incurred as a direct result of the violation.17 
Next, the court looked to Trope v. Katz,18 where the court 
held that the phrase “attorney’s fees” in Civil Code section 1717 
does not include compensation for an attorney’s time and effort 
spent representing him or herself or for professional business 
opportunities lost as a result of self-representation.19  The words 
“incur” and “attorney’s fees” were examined and their ordinary 
and usual meanings were found to imply an agency relationship 
inconsistent with self-representation.20  The general meaning of 
“incur” is “to become liable,” and “attorney’s fees” is the 
consideration a litigant actually pays or becomes liable to pay in 
exchange for legal representation; “[a]n attorney litigating in 
propria persona pays no such compensation.”21  The court 
reasoned that the language in section 128.7 should be interpreted 
in a similar manner and found that the inclusion of the words 
“incur” and “attorney’s fees” in this section also implied an 
agency relationship where the client and the attorney are not one 
and the same, and where the attorney expects remuneration.22 
The court additionally found that the statute viewed 
attorney’s fees as an expense and authorized a court to impose 
sanctions in the form of “reasonable attorney’s fees and other 
expenses incurred.”23  The word “expense” is associated with an 
obligation to pay, and a party who acts on his or her own behalf 
does not produce an expense that the party is obligated to pay.24  
Nor do lost earnings that a self-represented litigant might have 
obtained, but for devoting time to representing him or herself in 
litigation, constitute an expense.25 
The court acknowledged that two California appellate court 
cases upheld awards of attorney fees, both having identified a 
need to compensate parties who had been compelled to respond 
to bad faith tactics.26  Furthermore, the court noted that these 
courts found that to disallow an award of attorney’s fees to self-
represented attorneys would create “a separate and artificial 
category of litigants who would be inadequately protected against 
 17 Id. (citing § 1021(d)) (emphasis omitted). 
 18 902 P.2d 259 (Cal. 1995). 
 19 Musaelian, 198 P.3d at 562. 
 20 Id. 
 21 Id. (italics added). 
 22 Id. 
 23 Id. (citing § 1021(d)) (emphasis omitted). 
 24 Id. 
 25 Id. at 563. 
 26 Id. (discussing Abandonato v. Coldren, 41 Cal. App. 4th 264 (1995) and Laborde v. 
Aronson, 92 Cal. App. 4th 459 (2001)). 
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another party’s sanctionable activities.”27  The court found this 
reasoning to be inconsistent with the primary purpose of section 
128.7—to deter filing abuses, not to compensate those affected by 
them.28  This purpose would not suffer if attorney fees are not 
allowed for attorneys representing themselves.29  The court was 
not concerned that a party that engaged in abusive filing 
practices would have been able to avoid monetary sanctions 
simply because the opposing party was a self-represented 
attorney—because section 128.7 provides the trial court with a 
wide range of options, all of which are designed to deter filing 
abuses.30 
Holding  
The court held that an award of monetary sanctions for 
frivolous litigation tactics under Code of Civil Procedure section 
128.7 could include an award of attorney fees in favor of an 
attorney who represented him or herself. 
Legal Significance 
This decision reaffirms the idea that the phrase “attorney 
fees” does not include compensation for the time and effort 
attorneys expend representing themselves or for professional 
business opportunities lost because of self-representation.  It 
extends its application to section 128.7.  As a result of this 
decision, an attorney who responds pro se to a filing abuse may 
not recover sanctions under section 128.7 in the form of an award 
of attorney fees. 
 27 Id. (discussing Abandonato v. Coldren, 41 Cal. App. 4th 264 (1995) and Laborde v. 
Aronson, 92 Cal. App. 4th 459 (2001)). 
 28 Id. at 564. 
 29 Id. 
 30 Id. 
